Why Groups Are Politically Active: An Incentive-Theoretical Approach by Bolleyer, N & Weiler, F
1 
 
Why Groups Are Politically Active: 
An Incentive-Theoretical Approach 
 
Forthcoming: Comparative Political Studies 
 
Nicole Bolleyer (University of Exeter, UK) 
Florian Weiler (University of Basel, Switzerland) 
 
Abstract: Political activity is conventionally considered a constitutive feature of interest 
groups, underpinning an impressive literature on the strategies groups employ to exercise 
political influence. Whether and how intensely voluntary membership groups engage in 
political activities to start with, however, is rarely examined. We present a new incentive-
theoretical perspective on group political activity, considering both member demands and 
leadership constraints. We argue that investments in political activities (one way of 
generating collective incentives) as a means to prevent member exit are more or less 
important depending on a group’s composition. Simultaneously, the extent to which leaders 
are incentivized to cater to members’ demands when trying to balance these against 
conflicting demands, depends on communication channels between leaders and members 
and the importance of membership fees. Applying Bayesian ordered logit models to data 
from two group surveys supports our perspective and stresses the importance of 
considering how intra-organizational dynamics steer groups’ external activities. 
 
Keywords: Groups, political activity, incentive theory, intra-organizational characteristics, 
leader-member relations 
 
Corresponding author: Nicole Bolleyer, Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Armory 
Building, Rennes Driver, Exeter EX4 4NS, UK. Email: N.Bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk  
 
Acknowledgments: We are grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions we received 
from the anonymous reviewers. We further thank Jan Beyers, Nils-Christian Bormann, Joost 
Berkhout und Heike Klüwer as well as the participants of the ERC Workshop on ‘Regulating 
Civil Society’, held in June 2016 at the University of Exeter, who commented on an early 
version of this paper.    
 
 
  
2 
 
Introduction 
Political activity is conventionally considered as a constitutive or defining feature of interest 
groups (Truman, 1951; Berry, 1977). It is the criterion which sets them apart from inwards-
oriented civil society groups that focus on their membership without becoming politically 
active, as well as from service-providing groups that engage with the policy process in the 
output (implementation) rather than the input (agenda-setting or decision-making) stage. 
Whether firms – whose primary function is the making of economic profit – become 
lobbyists or not constitutes a puzzle and has been actively discussed (e.g. Bouwen, 2002; De 
Figueiredo & Kim, 2004; Drutman 2015). What motivates voluntary membership 
organizations1 to become interest groups2 in a political sense, in contrast, has rarely been 
examined. Interest group populations are commonly defined by their political activity, with 
supposedly ‘non-political’ groups excluded from the outset. This is because interest groups’ 
engagement in political activity is considered closely tied to their raison d’être (Lowery, 
2007), putting an emphasis on the strategies through which groups try to exercise political 
influence (e.g. Beyers, 2004; Binderkrantz, 2008; Dür & Mateo, 2013), moving attention 
away from whether and how intensely voluntary membership groups engage in political 
activities (hence transition from ‘group’ to ‘interest group’ status) in the first place. This 
paper addresses this caveat. 
To do so, we define political activity broadly as ‘any attempt to influence the 
decisions of any institutional elite on behalf of a collective interest’ (Jenkins, 1987: 29), 
which not only includes lobbying of government officials or bureaucrats in the narrow sense, 
but also covers public education and protest activities. This is important as groups can 
consider themselves as politically active (e.g. engaged in awareness raising or education) 
without perceiving this as lobbying (Bloodgood & Tremblay-Boire, 2016: 2). Empirically, the 
boundaries between politically active and inactive groups are fluid, as highlighted by the 
literature on hybrid organizations, which stresses how organizations try to reconcile often 
conflicting political and non-political goals (e.g. Minkoff, 2002; Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005). 
                                                          
1 We define voluntary organizations as organizations with a formalized infrastructure, that are private 
(separate from government), non-profit-distributing, self-governing and membership-based (Salamon & 
Anheier, 1998: 216), with members being either individuals or corporate actors such as firms, institutions or 
associations (Jordan, Halpin & Maloney, 2004). 
2 While in the context of this paper we use ‘group’ and ‘organization’ interchangeably, ‘group’ stresses more 
the composite nature of the actors we theorize and ‘organization’ their structural underpinning.  
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Indeed, groups might be only temporarily politically active – best characterized as latent 
interest groups (Berkhout, 2016: 10) – and still survive due to ‘non-political’ activities 
generating support, as demonstrated by predominantly service-oriented charities that only 
periodically engage in political activity (be this due to the nature of their mission, due to 
legal constraints or a mixture thereof). As Almong-Bar and Schmid (2014: 15) point out: 
“Participation in advocacy is not limited to organizations that define themselves as 
“advocacy organizations” and thus should be studied as an activity, and not as an 
organizational classification”. Meanwhile, Halpin urges scholars to go beyond a functional 
specification of interest groups, and to avoid the downplaying of other dimensions of group 
life as a consequence of defining groups as actors formed for the purpose of influencing 
public policy (2014: 7; 28; see also Moe, 1988: 1-2; Witko, 2015: 122). Which factors affect 
how intensely voluntary membership organizations engage in political activity is a 
theoretically and empirically important question for research on interest groups, third 
sector and civil society organizations alike, as they study supposedly distinct groups of 
organizations which, however, considerably overlap in practice (Hasenfeld & Gidreon, 2005: 
99-102).  
 
We address this question from an intra-organizational perspective which has been fruitfully 
applied to understand group governance (e.g. Halpin, 2006; Barakso & Schaffner, 2007; 
Binderkrantz, 2009), but is less commonly used to theorize or examine groups’ political 
orientations or activities (but see Berkhout, 2013: 229; Lowery, 2007; Halpin, 2014; Witko, 
2015). Unlike firms or formal institutions such as government units that lobby individually, 
voluntary membership organizations face the constant threat of member exit (whether 
members are individuals or organizations themselves). Thus, they need to make on-going 
efforts to sustain member support and loyalty (Olson, 1976; Wilson, 1973; Hirschman, 1970; 
Gray & Lowery, 1995). Lowery (2007) has stressed that before they can pursue any goals, all 
organizations need to ensure their survival. For organizations reliant on a voluntary 
membership, survival might depend more on factors such as resources for organizational 
maintenance (e.g. members, finances) than on the successful exercise of policy influence, 
suggesting a direct link between intra-organizational dynamics and a group’s external 
activities (Halpin, 2014: 24, 62-3). Berkhout (2010: 3, 12-3; 2013), in turn, has convincingly 
argued that organized activities should be understood as exchange relationships with 
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distinct audiences that organizations engage with simultaneously. While we consider 
political activity as a possible instead of a constitutive feature of voluntary membership 
organizations that have formed to jointly pursue a shared interest, we consider 
organizational members as a central ‘audience’ (Salisbury, 1992: 43) or ‘primary 
environment’ (Schmitter & Streeck 1999: 50) for this class of organization.3 
 
Starting out from here, we build on classical works on the maintenance and survival of 
voluntary groups that can be politically active or not (e.g. Clark & Wilson, 1961; Wilson, 
1973; Moe, 1988) and present an incentive-theoretical perspective on group political activity 
from which we derive several hypotheses. Essentially, our hypotheses theorize, on the one 
hand, how leaders4 sustain (rather than form) their organizations through different 
strategies of incentive provision to group members able to exit the organization at any point 
(Hirschman, 1970; Barakso & Schaffner, 2007). Investments in political activities play a more 
or less important part in such incentive provision, depending on the nature and composition 
of an organization’s membership (Wilson, 1973: 33-5). On the other hand, we hypothesize 
that leaders themselves are subject to intra-organizational incentive structures as generated 
by members’ particular role or position in the respective organization when they try to 
balance internal demands with conflicting external pressures (e.g. by government) 
(Schmitter & Streeck, 1999: 19, 21; Berkhout, 2013: 232). While leaders cannot ignore 
members altogether, the balance struck by leaders can take different shapes, which, in turn, 
feeds into whether investments in political activities are prioritized or not (Witko, 2015: 
122-5). This, in turn, is decisive for whether a membership group becomes an interest group 
in ‘functional terms’ (Lowery 2007; Halpin 2014).  
 
After developing our theoretical framework, we examine our hypotheses using data from 
two group surveys in Switzerland and Germany (Jentges et al., 2013), data that is 
particularly suitable to test our framework as the surveys used a bottom-up strategy to map 
group populations (Berkhout et al. forthcoming) leading to the inclusion a wide variety of 
                                                          
3 Our approach is applicable to collective voluntary groups, not to individual actors or institutions (e.g. firms or 
government agencies) (Salisbury 1992) which might lobby as well but need not deal with trade-offs between 
external pressures and member demands (Gray and Lowery 1996; Drutman 2015; Halpin et al forthcoming).  
4 We define leaders as those intra-organizational actors in charge of the day-to-day running of an organization, 
as well as the managing of its outside relations (e.g. Cigler & Loomis, 2012). 
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organizations ranging from classical interest groups (e.g. business associations) over service-
oriented professional associations to inwards-oriented hobby groups. Our findings 
substantiate our incentive-theoretical perspective. For instance, we expected organizations 
composed of individual members (compared to corporate members) to be less politically 
active. We further expected this only to hold as long as an organization’s individual 
membership size remains below a critical threshold. Above this threshold, a growing 
number of individual members strengthens an organization’s propensity towards political 
activity (as differences in size alters the type of incentive provision that is effective to 
prevent members from leaving). Our findings confirm this idea. Importantly, our findings 
hold even though we control for a range of ‘external’ factors (e.g. issue area, competition) 
that the literature highlights as important influences on organizations’ strategic choices (see 
e.g. Baumgartner & Leech, 2001) as well as country context. These findings provide a more 
nuanced understanding of the factors that motivate voluntary membership organizations to 
act like interest groups in a ‘functional sense’ by taking more serious the possibility that for 
many groups political activity might be one of many things they do, without necessarily 
being constitutive for their identity. We conclude with the broader repercussions of our 
findings and avenues for future research.  
 
An Incentive-Theoretical Perspective on Group Political Activity 
When theorizing the behavior of voluntary membership organization, it seems intuitive to 
theorize the nature of the leader-member relationship as being at the core of maintaining 
such organizations as collective actors. Indeed, case study research has stressed the 
importance of members and the resources they hold within the organization for the extent 
to which leaders can, or want, to prioritize political over other activities (Witko, 2015: 123-5; 
Halpin, 2014). Quantitative research, in contrast, often bypasses membership-related 
factors and more generally intra-organizational drivers of groups’ political activities (but see 
Binderkrantz 2009; Berkhout 2010; Halpin and Herschel III 2012a; 2012b). This is the case 
although Maloney (2015: 99; see also Jordan & Maloney, 1997) has prominently argued that 
leaders tailor organizational activities to their members’ preferences to provide an incentive 
mix that assures their organization’s maintenance. If this is the case, whether investments in 
political activities are worthwhile to organizations should be assessed accordingly.  
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Starting out from classical works (e.g. Clark & Wilson, 1961; Wilson, 1973), we thus 
propose an incentive-theoretical perspective on group political activity focusing on how 
organizations as collective actors sustain themselves (rather than dealing with questions 
around group formation and interest aggregation). We then develop hypotheses on the 
intra-organizational factors central to whether political activities are likely to be a priority 
for an organization or not. In the following, we theorize first which types of incentives 
leaders provide to their membership depending on the latter’s nature and composition 
(Wilson, 1973: 26-7) and second under which intra-organizational conditions leaders are 
incentivized to prioritize member demands over the demands of external audiences, a 
fundamental tension leaders have to manage on an continuous basis (Schmitter & Streeck 
1999: 15; 20; 23-4; Berkhout, 2013: 233-4). Both aspects are expected to feed into the 
extent to which group leaders make investments in political activities. 
 
How to Prevent Member Exit: The Nature and Composition of Membership Groups and 
their Investments in Political Activity 
Which incentives (or mix thereof) are most effective in achieving organizational stability is 
bound to depend on the nature of members as well as their number. The distinction 
between groups composed of individual members and those composed of corporate actors 
(e.g. institutions, firms or other associations), two types of members whose motivation for 
organizational membership will at least partially differ (Jordan et al., 2004: 203-4), can be 
expected to be central for which incentive mix can effectively induce these members to stay 
loyal and continue their support. This pushes leaders of differently constituted groups to 
provide distinct combinations of incentives to their members (Wilson, 1973: 26-7), which, in 
turn, either supports or weakens the prioritization of political activity as one mode of 
incentive provision. 5 
 
                                                          
5 The terminology used for various incentive or benefit types vary to some extent across central works such as 
by Wilson and Clark (1961), Wilson (1973) and Olson (1965). As for our purposes the specific distinctions 
between selective and collective incentives (whether material or not) and, more specifically, between solidary 
incentives (as one type of a non-material selective incentive) and selective material incentives are the most 
crucial, we stick to these as the main terms for the sake of clarity and do not discuss any other incentive types 
presented in the literature. Furthermore, central to our argument is our treatment of political activities as a 
(non-exclusive) collective incentive, as not only members benefit from them. 
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How do organizations composed of individuals differ from those composed of corporate 
members considering the role that political activity might play in sustaining organizational 
support? We can expect selective material incentives exclusively available to members (e.g. 
access to specific resources or services) to be equally relevant to sustain membership 
irrespective of the type of member. This is because both types of membership group suffer – 
ceteris paribus - from the same free-rider problem regarding political activity generating 
‘policy change’ as one possible collective incentive. For instance, if a favorable policy change 
can be achieved and the organization can effectively claim credit for it, membership of the 
organization is no prerequisite for benefitting from this change, i.e. non-members with 
similar interests can equally enjoy its advantages.6 This problem of non-exclusivity makes 
selective material incentives (that are exclusively accessible to members) crucial for the 
maintenance of voluntary organizations generally (Olson, 1965).  
In contrast, we expect a form of selective non-material incentives, solidary incentives, to be 
important to individual membership organizations but of little relevance to those composed 
of corporate members. Solidary incentives are generated by the personal satisfaction of 
members derived from associating with others (e.g. through joint activities strengthening 
members’ belonging to the group) (Clark & Wilson, 1961: 134-5; see also Salisbury, 1969). 
These incentives can be assumed to be an important driver of at least some individuals’ 
membership in groups who predominantly enjoy group life, rather than being interested in 
selective material incentives (e.g. access to member services) or collective incentives (e.g. 
the implementation of the organization’s political agenda). Members that are organizations 
or institutions themselves are unlikely to care much for activities strengthening feelings of 
group solidarity between each other. Thus, as far as internally provided incentives go, 
different from individual membership groups, selective solidary incentives are unlikely to be 
useful investments for leaders to prevent corporate members from free-riding.7 But why and 
how does the varying relevance of (selective) solidary incentives within individual and 
corporate membership groups matter for leaders’ investments in political activities 
                                                          
6 As specified later, political activity can also strengthen group attachments, i.e. it can generate different types 
of collective incentives. The main ‘difficulty’ in terms of incentive provision is that (whether ascribing it an 
instrumental or emotional underpinning) its benefits cannot be restricted to members. 
7 These do not have to be material in the narrow sense but could consist of status or special recognition 
derived from exclusive group membership. 
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(generating collective incentives)? Importantly, the engagement in activities able to 
generate distinct incentive types (e.g. political activities generating (non-exclusive) collective 
incentives through influencing government policy; joint social activities for members to 
strengthen group solidarity; service provision to members to generate selective material 
incentives) creates costs for an organization. As membership organizations with individual 
members (unlike corporate membership organizations) face pressure to sustain member 
support, not only through the provision of selective material, but also through (selective) 
solidary incentives, they face a trade-off between a more diverse (and more costly) demand 
for intra-organizational selective incentives from members and investments in externally 
oriented political activities (generating their own costs) (Witko, 2015: 125; Halpin et al. 
forthcoming). Put differently, organizations with individual members will – ceteris paribus - 
have fewer resources left to invest in political activity than those without individual 
members (as the latter are not expected to provide solidary incentives to members as well), 
which allows us to formulate an initial working hypothesis:  
If an organization has individual members, it is less politically active than an organization 
composed of corporate members. 
 
The nature of members, however, is only one central aspect defining a group’s basic 
composition. Another is membership size, which our working hypothesis assumes to be 
constant. Differences in size, however, fundamentally affect the balance of incentives that is 
most cost-effective not only to form an organization (Olson 1965: 48-50; 61), but also to 
sustain internal support post-formation. So what happens when membership organizations 
composed of individual members grow?  
Again returning to Wilson (1973: 13) and theorizing group political activity in relation 
to leaders’ efforts towards organizational maintenance, we can refine our initial hypothesis 
that rests on two arguments: all voluntary membership organizations will use to some 
extent selective material incentives to stabilize member support; and individual members 
are less instrumentally driven than corporate members and therefore receptive to solidary 
activities (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999: 14-15). If the second argument holds, individual 
members should also be receptive to political activities that strengthen the attachment to 
the organization’s cause, tapping into individuals’ emotional attachments (e.g. public 
protests), activities that target not only members but also sympathizers more broadly and 
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thus generate collective incentives. That said, as long as the organization is relatively small, 
solidary incentives should be more effective in stabilizing member support than collective 
political activities, as non-members can be more effectively excluded from the former 
(which, in turn, should make them more valuable to members).  
This, however, changes when an organization’s individual membership grows. Then 
the following three shifts take place, which can be expected to change the incentive mix 
most effective in sustaining organizational support, thereby making investments in political 
activities more worthwhile from the viewpoint of leaders: First, solidary incentives are more 
difficult to provide effectively in big organizations that, by their very nature, are more 
anonymous. As far as investments in solidarity incentives are less effective in mass 
organizations, resources are better invested in other incentives. Second, political activities 
can serve as ‘substitute’ for solidary incentives as a mechanism to strengthen a group’s 
identity. Particularly the pursuit of political goals through outsider or public political 
strategies (e.g. media campaigns) which are highly visible to members, media and 
sympathizers alike (Beyers, 2004: 213-14) can stress the importance of the organizations’ 
cause and thereby strengthen group attachments (compensating for intra-organizational 
solidary incentives becoming less effective). Again, individual members can be expected to 
be more receptive to such activities than more instrumentally driven corporate members. 
Third, the provision of selective material incentives, which need to be made available to 
each individual member, is bound to become increasingly costly the more members there 
are. This, in turn, makes alternative strategies for generating incentives to maintain member 
support more (cost)effective and thus more attractive; investments in political activities to 
generate collective incentives is one of these strategies. In conjunction, these three shifts 
suggest a ‘threshold effect’ when theorizing the relationship between individual 
membership and political activity.8 We can refine our initial working hypothesis in the 
following manner: 
 
                                                          
8 It is important to note that the implications of differences in membership size for political activity are 
theorized in the context of consolidated organizations that have already built up a core support base (assumed 
to be interested in a mix of incentives, rather than just one) and whose leaders are expected to choose 
(depending on membership size) different strategies to sustain this support accordingly. Our arguments do not 
apply to situations in which a new organization is created for the purpose of being politically active and based 
on this functional orientation builds up its membership. 
10 
 
H1A (Individual Membership Hypothesis): If a group has individual members, it is less likely 
to be politically active than one without, as long as the group is sufficiently small.  
 
H1B (Individual Membership Size Hypothesis): Once an individual membership group has 
reached a critical size, the further it grows, the more politically active it is likely to be.  
  
These hypotheses contrast with arguments made in the interest group literature stressing 
that individual membership groups tend to be bigger and more complex than membership 
groups composed of corporate actors (e.g. firms, associations, government units), and on 
this basis associating distinct processes of interest aggregation with each group type. Due to 
their higher complexity, individual membership groups are assumed to represent more 
diffuse interests as compared to the more specific interests represented by those groups 
composed of a smaller number of organizations (Berkhout, 2010: 46). Consequently, it has 
been argued that individual membership organizations (as they are usually bigger) are less 
politically active than corporate ones, as the higher number of members in organizations is 
associated with lower political activity. This argument hypothesizes a combined effect 
linking membership type to group size. Once disentangling the two, approaching the ability 
of an organization to engage in political activities as an aggregation problem allows us to 
formulate a third hypothesis specifically on the implications of having an increasing number 
of corporate members.  
Building on Olson (1965), we consider interest aggregation (and with it the 
engagement in joint political activity) as instrumentally driven, with each group member 
wanting to see his or her own interests considered in whatever political position the 
organization fights for. This makes the actual engagement in political activity the more 
difficult and demanding the more numerous, heterogeneous and complex member 
preferences become, whose management is a central problem of organizational design. This 
is because political activity not only requires the formation of a common line reconciling 
member preferences as such, but a common line with which most or the most important 
members are happy, which organizational leaders try to achieve by selecting, excluding, 
emphasizing and combining interests to transform them into a more or less coherent set of 
objectives (Schmitter & Streeck 1999: 14-15; 46). The nature of this process suggests that 
political activity (if evaluated in terms of whether it helps to pursue individual member goals 
rather than functioning as identify-strengthening activity) might be controversial as 
members disagree over what line to take, making an organization vulnerable (Halpin, 2014: 
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23). Such vulnerability grows the bigger and more complex an organization becomes, 
making alternative, less contested modes of incentive provision (e.g. provision of services) 
more attractive to organizational leaders that are concerned about the organization’s 
maintenance than investments in political activities.  
We expect this negative relationship between bigger size and political activity to 
particularly affect groups composed of corporate members. This is because the argument 
made presupposes that members are instrumentally driven and consider political activity as 
a way to pursue their own, particular interests, an assumption – as argued earlier – that is 
more convincing with regard to corporate members than individuals who might care more 
about the provision of solidary incentives or be driven by their value orientations instead 
(Clark & Wilson, 1961: 134-5; LaPalombara, 1964: 18; Schmitter & Streeck, 1999: 14-15). 
This leads us to third hypothesis theorizing the link between an organization’s basic 
composition in terms of corporate members and political activity: 
 
H2 (Corporate Membership Hypothesis): The more corporate membership organizations 
grow, the less they are politically active. 
 
When Leaders Prioritize Member Demands: Members’ Voice and Member Finances  
While voluntary organizations generally depend on membership support (Wilson, 1973), 
Jordan et al. have stressed that only a minority of groups are interested in or able to 
enhance member involvement (2004: 209). The extent to which members are involved in 
decision-making varies widely (Barakso & Schaffner, 2007: 16; Halpin, 2006). Group 
members, mindful of the costs of a more active involvement, might be perfectly happy to 
remain passive and not be interested in actively shaping their organization’s priorities as 
long as the latter do not directly clash with their preferences (Maloney, 2015: 102). The 
extent to which members play a role for what types of activities a group engages in, and 
which activities are prioritized by leaders, is likely to depend on the mechanisms within the 
organization that allow members to communicate their preferences to leaders and which 
members are likely to use such channels. These, in turn, generate different levels of intra-
organizational pressure on leaders to consider members in their on-going attempts to 
reconcile internal and external demands (Berkhout, 2013). 
12 
 
Members (individual or corporate) who hold strong political views and desire specific 
policy changes can be expected to care most about having communication channels to 
receive information from leaders; they are also more likely to actively use these channels to 
communicate their demands back to them (as compared to members that predominantly 
enjoy participation in group life, joined to gain access to the services offered by the 
organization and predominantly operate as ‘passive consumers’ or ‘check book supporters’). 
If so, the pressure on the organization to actively pursue members’ political interests should 
be higher the more numerous the available communication channels are, and the more 
frequently they are used. To consider this dimension is particularly important in light of new 
technologies that significantly reduced the costs especially for large and complex 
organizations to communicate with their membership (Karpf 2012: 162; Halpin et al 2017: 
4). 
 
Furthermore, the responsiveness of leaders to members’ demands can be expected to vary 
depending on whether members are important contributors to an organization’s budget 
(Schmitter & Streeck, 1999: 50; Witko, 2015: 123). While not all members are interested in 
their organization’s political activities, if (as argued earlier) members with strong beliefs are 
more vocal, as well as being more likely to leave when dissatisfied with the organization, 
financial dependency on member fees should reinforce the incentives for the organization 
to stress its ability to visibly push for members’ political interests. This is why growing 
dependency on membership fees should increase the likelihood of organizations to be 
politically active.  
This leads to our final two hypotheses each referring to a factor that enhances the 
intra-organizational influence that active members can exercise within an organization, 
which creates incentives for leaders to engage in political activities facing countervailing 
external pressures (e.g. dependency on government funds incentivizing the downplaying of 
political activism instead, see on this Bloodgood & Tremblay-Boire, 2016).  
 
H3 (Member Communication Hypothesis): The more numerous and the more actively used 
communication channels between leaders and members, the more politically active a group 
is likely to be. 
 
H4 (Membership Fees Hypothesis): The more dependent a group is on membership fees, 
the more politically active it is likely to be. 
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Country Selection, Data and Measurements 
We test our framework across two different country settings, Switzerland and Germany, 
which differ in a variety of systemic characteristics relevant to group maintenance and the 
costliness of political activity. These are: the degree of societal heterogeneity (multilingual 
vs. monolingual), population size, regime type (parliamentary vs. separation of powers), 
presence/absence of referenda and welfare state type (conservative vs. liberal9). 
Furthermore, while both systems are constitutionally federal, German federalism – due to 
its different party system – is considerably more centralized than Swiss federalism 
(Thorlakson, 2009). Consequently, if our hypotheses find support across these two settings, 
this is unlikely to be the result of country specificities. 
 
To test our hypotheses we use two new group datasets, that are particularly suitable to test 
our framework as group populations were mapped through a ‘bottom-up strategy’ 
(Berkhout et al. forthcoming) leading to the inclusion a wide variety of organizations ranging 
from classical interest groups (e.g. business associations) over service-oriented professional 
associations to inwards-oriented hobby groups (thus covering the full spectrum of political 
activity levels). Consequently, a list of groups for Germany and Switzerland was compiled 
using the most comprehensive and – where possible – official sources (Wonka et al 2010). 
For Germany, the main source was the ‘Taschenbuch des öffentlichen Lebens – Deutschland 
2010’ (Oeckl, 2010), a directory of currently active national and regional organizations, 
complemented by the list of officially registered lobby organizations with the German 
Bundestag (the so-called ‘Lobbyliste’). In Switzerland, the main source was the ‚Publicus: 
Schweizer Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Lebens’ (Schwabe, 2009), whose coverage is similarly 
inclusive to the ‘Taschenbuch des öffentlichen Lebens’.10 This was complemented by the 
parliament’s ‘Gästeregister’ (guest registry) and information from the website 
www.verbaende.ch for potentially relevant organizations not yet included in the list. The 
different lists were merged, and duplicate entries deleted. During this coding process the 
postal, Internet, and email addresses of each group’s central office, and (where possible) 
                                                          
9 The classification of Switzerland is much debated. However, Ebbinghaus (2012: 15-16, Table 2) shows that 
most studies classify it as liberal welfare state. 
10 Both directories cover economic and political but also social and cultural associations and clubs. 
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the Internet and email addresses of the organization’s communication departments were 
recorded. These email addresses were used as the email-database to distribute the online 
questionnaire. Data collection was completed in 2011 in Switzerland, and in Germany 2012. 
The response rate was 40% for Switzerland and 23% for Germany. While these response 
rates are similar to comparable studies (see e.g. Dür and Mateo, 2013; Eising, 2009), the 
difference between the two countries is potentially problematic.11 However, several checks 
on a range of variables such as membership, group type, age, and political activity show that 
the two country samples are comparable to each other, and to samples reported in other 
studies (see Appendix A for details). Hence, sampling bias due to unit nonresponse is 
unlikely to be problematic. When considering item nonresponse, we are left with 1034 
organizations that completed all questions relevant for our analysis.12 Because our 
framework theorizes the internal dynamics of membership groups, we excluded all groups 
with neither individual nor corporate members, which left us with 939 observations.13 All 
variables used in this paper but one are derived from this dataset (see details below). 
 
Operationalization of Dependent Variable 
To capture political activity respondents were asked how often they are politically active: 
‘Never’, ‘Rarely’, ‘Sometimes’, ‘Often’, ‘Very often’. This variable encapsulates both the 
likelihood of organizations to be politically active and the intensity of political activity. We 
find that 76 groups in our dataset (8.1%) are never politically active, while 174 groups 
(18.5%) are rarely, 288 (30.7%) sometimes, 251 (26.8%) often, and 149 (15.9%) very often 
politically active. Respondents did not only vary in the intensity of political activity, but also 
whether they reported that they are political active at all, reflecting the wide range of 
organizations included. Positive coefficients in the statistical models indicate higher activity 
levels.14  
                                                          
11 The difference in the response rate is potentially explained by the survey request coming from a reputable 
Swiss institution, which might have prompted a higher number of Swiss than German groups to respond. 
12 For more information on missing data and item nonresponse checks, see Appendix D. 
13 The 95 removed organisations are mostly single businesses. After removing them, we are left with 484 
observations from Switzerland, and 455 from Germany. 
14 Survey questions can be problematic, because respondents might understand the questions in various ways, 
or interpret the categories differently. As a check whether our political activity variable captures what we 
intend to measure, we construct a second variable making use of a range of other survey items regarding 
political activity. We also asked survey participants how often they engage in political activities targeted at 
specific audiences: the government, political parties, the media, and the general public. These four questions 
are also on a five-point scale from rarely (1) to very often (5), and we sum these four variables up as a second 
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Operationalization of Explanatory Variables 
To test H1A (Individual Membership Hypothesis) and H1B (Individual Membership Size 
Hypothesis), we include a membership dummy which captures whether a group has 
individual members (1) or not (0). Of the 939 interest organizations in the dataset 647 have 
individuals as members (approximately 69%). We further include how many individual 
members organizations had, a highly skewed variable, which we include as logged into our 
models. To test our Corporate Membership Hypothesis (H2), we measure the number of 
corporate members in an organization.15 Again, this variable is highly skewed, which is why 
we use the logarithm. To operationalize H3 (Member Communication Hypothesis) we 
developed a measure that captures the communication channels in an organization and the 
intensity of communication between leaders and their members, capturing both traditional  
channels of communication (e.g. direct contract with members, events for members, etc.) 
and those exploiting increasingly important new technologies (e.g. e-mailing lists, Twitter, 
etc.) (Karpf 2012). To obtain such a measure we rely on nine variables that record how often 
organizations communicate with their own members (see Appendix B), and asks 
respondents how often they use these communication channels on a five-point scale 
ranging from ‘almost never’ (0) to ‘daily’ (4). To generate the index, the numeric values of 
these nine variables were summed up (hence higher values represent a higher intensity of 
communication).16 Finally, we measure an organization’s reliance on membership fees to 
test our Membership Fee Hypothesis (H4) based on a survey item asking organization about 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
measure of group activity. Using both these activity variables as numerical variables, they exhibit a highly 
significant correlation coefficient of 0.602. This indicates that the political activity variable used as the 
dependent variable in this study does indeed capture what we intended.  
15 Corporate membership organizations encompass organizations composed of associations, businesses or 
institutional actors. 
16 This index combines traditional communication tools with electronic forms of communication such as email, 
but also relatively new communication channels such as social media. It thus captures the entire array of 
communication techniques available to groups, and is therefore better able to capture communication with 
members than any of the individual communication variables alone. However, factor analysis of the nine 
communication variables shows that they basically fall into two groups (i.e. factors), where traditional forms of 
communication (direct contact, organisation of events) load on the same factor as mailing lists and 
newsletters, while the second factor is mostly composed of the newest communication techniques via social 
media, Twitter, and blogs. This shows the reliability of the data and the data structure. However, as the two 
factors are not of equal importance and are composed of different numbers of highly loading variables, we do 
not obtain the factor loadings and use them in the analysis, but construct the index as described. For more 
information see Appendix B.  
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this income source. As this variable is highly skewed, the variable is logged (see for details 
Appendix C). 
 
Control Variables 
To ensure that the estimates of our main explanatory variables are unbiased, we include the 
level of competition that groups face. As the general level of competition links to the 
competition for members, this is an important control (e.g. Gray & Lowery 1996: 96; 
Baumgartner and Leech 2001), and we expect the level of activity to increase with 
competition (Weiler, 2016). To capture competition between groups we rely on a survey 
question on the visibility of other groups in the field of activity of an organization, which 
could be answered on a five-point scale from not at all visible (1) to highly visible (5). Group 
type is also an important indicator for how groups behave (e.g. Binderkrantz, 2008, Klüver, 
2012, Weiler & Brändli, 2015). As cause groups face a stronger collective-action problem 
than sectional groups who cater to a more clearly defined constituency (Klüver 2012: 1116-
7; Dür & De Bièvre, 2007: 972), we expect the former to be more politically active to 
incentivize members to stay (or new members to join). To measure this variable, all 
organizations in the dataset were hand-coded, with 282 cases (about 30%) being cause 
groups. State subsidies are an important form of income for interest organizations, which 
may have a negative impact on the political activity of groups as the receipt of state funding 
can be linked to restrictions regarding organizations’ political activities (Becker, 1983; 
Bloodgood & Tremblay-Boire, 2016).We include the amount of state subsidies received by 
organizations, provided by survey respondents, to the models. Due to the skewedness of 
this variable the logged form is included in the models. The issue area is also an important 
determinant for the political activity of interest organizations (Baumgartner & Leech, 2001, 
Klüver, 2011). Therefore, we also include the main issue area of groups’ political activity into 
the models, as identified by the groups in the surveys. Specifically, we identify the following 
six issues areas in our dataset: economics, education, social issues, environment, religion, 
and others. To capture potential differences in political activity stemming from the length of 
time an interest organization has already been part of the political system we include an 
organization’s age expecting a negative relationship with political activity due to the higher 
institutional knowledge, which allows groups to better recognize when to become active 
and whom to target. Finally, we control for potential systematic differences between group 
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behavior in our two countries and include a country dummy (with Switzerland as base 
category).  
 
Further details (including descriptive statistics and a correlation table) on all variables as 
well as the survey items based on which our measures were constructed are provided in 
Appendix C. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Model Choice – Bayesian Ordered Logit Models 
In this section we present the empirical findings. Given that the dependent variable (political 
activity) is categorical in nature and on a five-point scale with a clear ordering, we opt for 
ordered logit models. We estimate the model using a Bayesian approach and Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations. This approach is well suited for our dataset, since we 
have a) survey data, and b) many missing values due to item nonresponse (see Appendix D 
for a description of the problem and robustness checks). Both these elements introduce 
uncertainty into the estimation of our model parameters. Sampling from the posterior 
distribution for specified quantities of interest to obtain predictions for posterior means and 
highest posterior density (HPD) intervals allows accounting for these uncertainties (Gelman 
et al. 2013). The MCMC algorithm we use is called via the Stan Modeling Language and 
implemented in C++. We utilize the user interface rstan available in the R computing 
environment, which automatically translates the model into the Stan Modeling Language, 
runs the model, and returns the result. Stan uses Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) sampling 
– a form of MCMC sampling – which is highly efficient and converges to stationarity much 
faster than more traditional Gibbs samplers (Stan Development Team, 2016).17 We run the 
models using four parallel chains with 10,000 iterations, of which the first 3,000 are used as 
burn-in. Autocorrelation between consecutive iterations of our chains is unproblematic. 
Therefore, no thinning is required and we have an effective chain length of 28,000. Various 
diagnostics indicate that only a short chain length of about 4,000 is required for stationarity 
(Raftery and Lewis's diagnostic), and that the sampled chains passed the stationarity test for 
                                                          
17 A comparison between the Gibbs sampler and Stan’s HMC sampler shows that our main model requires 
about one million iterations to achieve convergence for the former, while the later only needs a few thousand 
iterations for convergence.  
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all parameters (Heidelberger and Welch's convergence diagnostic). Finally, the scale 
reduction statistics (Gelman & Rubin, 1992) for all parameters are very close to 1, which 
shows that the four chains drawn for the same coefficient are almost identical. This is 
another indication for the convergence of the chains after the burn-in period. Overall, we 
conclude that the chains are sufficient in length and have converged to the target posterior 
distribution. Because we do not possess prior knowledge about the main effects in our 
model (apart from the theoretically derived hypotheses), we set uninformative priors and 
let the likelihood determine the posterior distribution. 
 
Findings 
Table 1 presents the posterior means and Highest Posterior Density intervals (HPD) for all 
parameters in the three models. Model 1 is the full model including all observations with 
complete information from both surveys. In Models 2 and 3 we present findings for 
Germany (Model 2) and Switzerland (Model 3) only. Expecting our hypotheses to apply 
equally in the two different country settings, we do this to check whether our results hold in 
both political systems, or whether they are driven by group properties in one country only.18 
As an additional check regarding whether missing values in our data are problematic, we 
used multiple imputation techniques to run the same models again for all organizations in 
the survey that indicate that they have either individual or corporate members. We thereby 
almost doubled the number of observations from 939 to 1780. The results are stable both 
for the full model as well as the two country models, which indicates that our missing values 
are indeed missing at random (see Appendix D for the imputed models and more 
information on missing data), underlining the robustness of our findings. 
Table 1 shows the Bayesian point estimate and the 95% HPD for each variable in the 
model. Other than frequentist approaches, which treat parameters as fixed and constructs 
confidence interval with a specific probability of containing that ‘true value’, Bayesian 
approaches treat the point value as random and calculate posterior distributions providing 
probability values for that ‘random parameter’. The provided point estimate is the value 
                                                          
18 In the main model, we use a dummy variable approach as random effects and clustered standard errors 
require a much larger number of countries. In addition to the separate ‘country models’, we applied 
interaction effects between our main explanatory variables and the country dummy. While all the main effects 
in these models remain stable, none of the interaction terms are significant, supporting the robustness of our 
findings (the respective models are provided in Appendix E). 
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with the highest probability, given the current knowledge we possess, and the 95% HPD is 
the probability distribution of the random parameter we are after. The more we learn about 
the parameter, the narrower the HPD should get (see Samaniego, 2011). 
 
Table 1: Posterior summaries for determinants of political activity of groups in Switzerland 
and Germany 
 
 Model 1 
Full model 
Ord. logit 
Model 2 
Germany 
Ord. logit 
Model 3 
Switzerland 
Ord. logit 
Presence of individual members (H1A) -0.85 -0.79 -1.02 
 [-1.34, 0.37] [-1.49, -0.09] [-1.74, -0.31] 
Individual membership size (H1B)  0.10 0.09 0.13 
 [0.04, 0.16]  [0.01, 0.18] [0.03. 0.23] 
Corporate membership size (H2) -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 [-0.08, 0.03] [-0.10, 0.06] [-0.10, 0.06] 
Member communication (H3) 0.06 0.06 0.05 
 [0.04, 0.08] [0.03, 0.09] [0.02, 0.09] 
Membership fees (H4) 0.16 0.10 0.23 
 [0.09, 0.22] [0.01, 0.19] [0.13, 0.32] 
 
Control Variables 
 
Competition (base=no competition) 
   
Low competition 1.32 1.53 1.13 
 [0.81, 1.83] [0.73, 2.35] [0.45, 1.18] 
Medium competition 1.65 1.84 1.57 
 [1.16, 2.16] [1.05, 2.64] [0.98, 2.24] 
High competition 2.06 2.39 1.73 
 [1.50, 2.62] [1.51, 3.28] [0.97, 2.48] 
Very high competition 2.54 2.75 2.50 
 [1.75, 3.33] [1.65, 3.87] [1.13, 3.72] 
Group type (base=sectional group)    
Cause group 0.69 0.71 0.58 
 [0.40, 0.98] [0.29, 1.13] [0.14, 1.02] 
State subsidies -0.01 0.02 -0.05 
 [-0.03, 0.01) [-0.01, 0.06] [-0.08, -0.02] 
Age of group -0.14 -0.21 -0.07 
 [-0.28, -0.00] [0.10, 0.41] [-0.28, 0.14] 
Country dummy (base=CH) 0.45   
 [0.20, 0.71]   
Issue area (base=economic groups)    
Education -0.68 -0.77 -0.65 
 [-1.07, -0.29] [-1.36, -0.20] [-1.12, -0.12] 
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Religion -1.23 -1.26 -1.06 
 [-2.14, -0.34]  [-2.43, -0.10] [-2.60, 0.47] 
Social -0.27 -0.26 -0.41 
 [-0.64, 0.10] [-0.80, 0.28] [-0.95, 0.12] 
Environment -0.28 -0.44 -0.13 
 [-0.84, 0.28] [-1.25, 0.28] [-0.93, 0.66] 
Other groups 0.11 -0.08 0.24 
 [-0.23, 0.44] [-0.61, 0.45] [-0.21, 0.70] 
Intercepts    
1|2 0.59 -0.20 1.08 
 [-0.34, 1.52] [-1.61, 1.18] [-0.18, 2.36] 
2|3 2.25 1.29 2.90 
 [1.32, 3.18] [-0.11, 2.68] [1.65, 4.19] 
3|4 3.87 2.83 4.65 
 [2.92, 4.83] [1.42, 4.25] [3.35, 5.98] 
4|5 5.50 4.46 6.39 
 [4.53, 6.48] [3.03, 5.91] [5.04. 7.77] 
WAIC 2637.08 1297.48 1357.31 
Num.obs. 939 455 484 
Note: The table reports point estimates (posterior means) and 95% HPD intervals (in squared 
brackets) for all parameters in the models 
 
So does the nature and composition of an organization’s membership shape the extent to 
which investments in political activity form an important part of an organization’s incentive 
provision directed towards preventing members from leaving (Hirschman, 1970; Barakso & 
Schaffner, 2007; Wilson, 1973: 33-5), as theorized in our Individual Membership Hypothesis 
and our Individual Membership Size Hypothesis (H1A and H1B)? The presence of individual 
members should negatively influence organizations’ political activity level. Such groups are 
expected to be less politically active because the provision of solidarity incentives – through 
social activities for members for instance – generates costs. These costs, both staff time 
and/or financial resources, reduce the resources individual membership organizations have 
at their disposal to invest in political activities. Organizations with only corporate members, 
in contrast, do not have to bear such costs, in turn, freeing resources for political activity. 
Indeed, the effect of the individual membership dummy we use to operationalize H1A is a 
strong predictor of political activity. For instance, the negative posterior mean of -0.85 in 
Model 1 for the individual membership dummy indicates that groups with (few) individual 
members are considerably less likely to be in the higher political activity categories than 
groups without individual members. We further sampled from the posterior distributions to 
obtain estimates for specified quantities of interest. For instance, fixing all covariates to 
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meaningful values and then obtaining samples for organizations with and without individual 
members, the model predicts 41.4% of organizations without individual membership to be 
often or very often politically active (the two highest political activity levels), while only 
23.4% of organizations with individual members are expected to exhibit such high levels of 
political activity. This interesting finding begins to address the research gap identified by 
Jordan et al. (2004: 202), who state that the implication of membership-related 
characteristics of organizations tend to be under-researched. Related to organizational 
investments in political activity more particularly, Berkhout (2010: 47) indicates that 
“scholars have seldom directly compared the activities of organizations with different types 
of supporters”, a problem our study directly addresses. One argument to explain the 
support for our Individual Membership Hypothesis (H1A) is that groups serving 
(predominantly) individual members have to reinforce the loyalty of these members by 
offering more (costly) selective solidarity incentives which stress the ‘fun factor’ of being 
together and part of the group (Jordan & Maloney, 2007: 46) and the enjoyment of group 
life (see Clark & Wilson, 1961: 134-5). Such activities cannot be seen as political and are 
generally less important for corporate membership. But since they are costly, groups using 
them have fewer funds left than corporate membership groups, and as a consequence their 
political activity levels are lower. 
According to our Individual Membership Size Hypothesis we, in turn, expected the 
intensity of groups’ political activity levels to increase as the number of individual members 
increases. Again, our findings support this expectation, as the positive and influential 
coefficients of the individual membership size variable across all models indicate. The 
predicted effects in the models are influential and fairly strong. Again sampling from the 
posterior distribution, the coefficient of 0.10 for the individual membership size variable in 
Model 1 translates, all else equal, into a predicted value of only 23.4% of groups with very 
few individual members that are often or very often politically active (as should be the case 
as this is in line with the findings presented in the previous paragraph and thus H1A). 
However, from there the predicted activity levels quickly increase. When organizations grow 
to 1,000 individual members, 37.4% of organizations are expected to fall into the highest 
two activity categories. And when they have about 10,000 individual members, more than 
45% of the organizations sampled from the posterior distribution are predicted to be often 
or very often politically active. Thus, organizations of that size overtake the activity levels of 
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organizations without individual membership. For organizations with the highest number of 
individual members in our dataset about 55% are predicted to fall into the highest two 
activity categories. This suggests that political activities can strengthen group attachment 
and act as incentives for individual members of (particularly large) organizations to stay with 
the latter. It also echoes Jordan and Maloney’s argument (1998: 391) that group size 
influences political participation positively because broad support increases the attention 
interest organizations can attract, and thus facilitates both voice and access strategies the 
organization can employ in the political process. This, in turn, is in line with Thrall’s point 
(2006: 410) that a larger individual membership base can be regarded as another resource 
which helps groups to increase organizational activity levels, in particularly with regards to 
voice strategies, i.e. political activities designed to reach the general public, such as media 
campaigns or protests. Simultaneously, the finding challenges works arguing that individual 
membership groups represent more diffuse interests as compared to the more specific 
interests represented by groups composed of a smaller number of organizations, making 
political activity more difficult and less likely in the former than the latter (Berkhout 2010: 
46).  
Figure 1 summarizes the findings of our Individual Membership Hypothesis and our 
Individual Membership Size Hypothesis and brings them together. On the left-hand side of 
the sub-plots we depict the predicted values for organizations without individual members 
for the two highest activity levels (in grey). Moving from these organizations to those with 
only very few individual members, the figures show that the posterior means predict much 
lower activity levels for such groups, in line with our Individual Membership Hypothesis 
(H1A). In other words, small groups composed of individual members are expected to be 
much less active and tend to be more often in the lower activity categories. However, as 
individual membership size increases, groups become increasingly politically active, 
substantiating H1B. At around 5,000 individual members, organizations’ activity levels are 
predicted to be on par with organizations without individual members. From then onwards, 
political activity levels increase and larger groups are expected to be more politically active, 
than groups without individual members (note that although the HPD intervals overlap 
somewhat, the Bayesian models still allow us to state with some confidence that very large 
individual membership groups are more active than those without individual members). 
These findings are similar irrespective of whether the full sample is used, or whether the 
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models for the two countries are run separately, underlining the robustness of these 
findings.  
 
 
Figure 1: Predicted values (posterior means) for high and very high political activity levels 
depending on individual membership size (including 95% HPD intervals) 
  
 
 
Moving on to the leaders, depending on the presence of communication channels actively 
used by members and an organization’s dependence on membership fees, leaders are 
indeed incentivized to cater to members’ political demands when trying to balance them 
against conflicting external pressures to different degrees. As theoretically expected, both 
intra-organizational features feed into investments in political activities. Communication 
with members, according to the models in Table 1, is a strong predictor for the general level 
of political activity in line with our Member Communication Hypothesis (H3). These findings 
are very strong, and the magnitude of the effect is substantial. Organizations with the 
lowest level of membership communication, according to Model 1 of Table 1, only have a 
likelihood of 19.2% of being often or very often politically active. This value increases to 
60.5% for the organizations with the highest level of communication between organizational 
leaders and group members. At the mean of the membership communication variable 
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(12.97) approximately 33.6% of organizations are predicted to fall into the two highest 
activity categories. Thus, the presence of communication channels and their active usage 
incentivizes leaders to pursue members’ political interests (as those members with strong 
political views are more likely to bear the costs of actively voicing demands in the first place, 
compared to members driven by the desire to gain access and passively consume 
organizational services). This finding echoes insights from the exchange theory of interest 
groups proposed by Salisbury (1969). Members expect benefits from their continued 
participation in the group. When members actively articulate demands (and bear the costs 
of doing so) yet leaders decide to ignore them, the likelihood of exit is particularly high.   
The growing dependency on membership fees has similar implications and increases 
the likelihood of organizations to be politically active, and more intensely so, substantiating 
our Membership Fees Hypothesis (H4). Such dependency incentivizes group leaders to 
visibly demonstrate their value to their individual members to provide enough incentives to 
members with strong political views to prevent them from leaving and possibly switching to 
a competitor. Consequently, an exchange relationship between leaders and members also 
shapes political activities and activity levels in a financial sense (Witko, 2015: 123). We can 
see in Table 1 that higher dependency on membership fees indeed increases the degree of 
activity of interest organizations. This finding is both valid in the pooled Model 1 including 
data from both countries, and in the two separate country models. Sampling from the 
posterior distribution of the full model to obtain predicted values, the organizations with 
the smallest revenue coming from membership fees are expected to fall into the two 
highest activity levels ‘only’ in about 23.5% of the cases, while for the richest organizations 
this value rises to over 65%. The effect for the full model including all 939 observations is 
graphically depicted in Figure 2. The plot shows that organizations generating only small 
amounts of revenue via membership fees are more likely to be never or only rarely 
politically active, while organizations with higher income from this source of are less likely to 
fall into these two low activity categories, while their predicted probabilities for the two 
highest activity categories increase. This suggests that higher dependency on financial 
contributions coming directly from members increases the responsiveness of group leaders, 
in turn, substantiating our Membership Fees Hypothesis. 
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Figure 2: Predicted effect (posterior means) of membership fees on the level of political 
activity of groups (including 95% HPD intervals) 
 
  
While three hypotheses derived from our incentive-theoretical perspective on group 
political activity were substantiated by our analysis, we do not find support for our 
Corporate Membership Hypothesis (H2). We theorized that as the number of – 
instrumentally driven – corporate members increases, groups become more heterogeneous 
and more difficult to steer by the groups’ leaders. As a consequence, we can expect less 
consensus about the direction the group should take politically, which should disincentivize 
leaders’ investments in political activity. However, our models provide no evidence in 
support of this hypothesis. The coefficients in all three models of Table 1 are close to zero 
and have comparatively large HPD intervals. This is in itself an interesting finding. Our 
Corporate Membership Hypothesis theorized incentive provision to sustain a group and its 
repercussions for political activity – building on Olson (1965) – as a problem of interest 
aggregation (aggravated by a growing number of corporate members aiming to maximize 
their separate interests). This rationale contrasts with theorizing investments in political 
activities as one mode of incentive provision that leaders need to balance against the 
provision of other incentive types, as done in our Individual Membership Hypothesis and our 
Individual Membership Size Hypothesis that were both substantiated. 
 
Concluding with control variables, several variables derived from central earlier works show 
significant effects in the theoretically expected direction. The positive (and growing) 
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coefficients of the competition variable show that with each step of increased competition 
the level of political activity increases. In other words, when groups are faced with tougher 
competition in their field of activity, they react by increasing their activity levels. These 
findings corroborate theoretical expectations of Gray und Lowery (1995, 1996), and more 
recent empirical findings by Mahoney (2008). Group type as a predictor variable also 
influences the political activity of groups as theoretically expected (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007: 
972). Cause groups, according to our models, tend to exhibit higher activity levels than 
sectional groups. The former, according to Olson (1965: 126), are less able to supply 
selective incentives to their members, compared to other types of groups. As a 
consequence, in order to prevent members from switching to a competitor interest 
organization, cause groups only are pressed to increase their political activity levels to signal 
their utility to their members (also see Binderkrantz, 2009; Jordan & Maloney, 1998). Finally, 
we also find that the issue area in which organizations operate matters for political activity, 
with economic groups being particularly active compared to groups in (most) other issue 
areas. That our main findings hold despite these important variables shaping political 
activity underlines the importance of considering intra-organizational aspects as theorized 
by our incentive-theoretical perspective. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The question under which conditions voluntary membership organizations become ‘interest 
groups’ by engaging in political activity is rarely addressed in the interest group literature 
predominantly focused on strategies through which political influence is exercised rather 
than how intensely groups engage in political activity in the first place (e.g. Beyers, 2004; 
Binderkrantz, 2008; Dür & Mateo, 2013). This is problematic as groups might be politically 
active only periodically (Schlozman 2010) and ensure their survival by generating support 
through a variety of ‘non-political’ activities (Almong-Bar and Schmid 2014). This paper has 
addressed this caveat, which is important – theoretically and empirically - not only to 
interest group research but also to research on civil society and third sector organizations, 
literatures that have widely remained separate.  
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Building on classical works on group maintenance and survival (e.g. Clark & Wilson, 
1961; Wilson, 1973; Moe, 1988) we presented an incentive-theoretical perspective on group 
political activity, focusing on the demands of organizational members (Wilson, 1973: 33-5) 
and intra-organizational constraints imposed on leaders (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999: 19, 21; 
Berkhout, 2013: 232). Factors linked to each dimension were theorized regarding whether 
investments in political activities as one strategy to generate collective incentives are 
prioritized in different types of groups or not (Witko, 2015: 122-5). In line with our 
theoretical expectations, our analysis found that organizations composed of individual 
members (compared to corporate members) are less politically active, as long as 
membership size remains below a critical threshold. Above this threshold, individual 
members strengthen an organization’s propensity towards political activity, as differences in 
size alter the type of incentive provision that is effective to prevent members from leaving. 
Regarding how intra-organizational incentives shape the priorities of leaders, we found – 
again in line with our hypotheses – that organizations with stronger communication 
channels and higher dependency on membership fees to be more politically active.  
We already find excellent works that theorize the impact of intra-organizational 
characteristics on group governance (e.g. Schmitter & Streeck, 1999; Halpin, 2006; Barakso 
& Schaffner, 2007; Binderkrantz, 2009), and the connection between such characteristics 
and organizations’ external activities such as political activity has been highlighted 
(Berkhout, 2010; Halpin, 2014; Witko, 2015). Yet to our knowledge, the latter neither has 
been explicitly theorized nor tested based on large-N data. Our findings accounting for how 
actively organizations engage in political activities have important normative repercussions, 
as recent studies point to the falling number of organizations composed of individual 
members (e.g. Schlozman et al., 2015), and the increasing number of ‘members’ who are 
content not to be actively involved in their organization’s internal life (e.g. Skocpol, 2003; 
Maloney, 2009). Our findings suggest that having few individual members affects negatively, 
while having many individual members affects positively how politically active an 
organization is, which, in turn, has important repercussions for how willing and able 
organizations are to channel their members’ interest into the political process and engage in 
effective citizen representation. This puts a different light on mass organizations that are 
often portrayed as unresponsive ‘oligarchic’ structures. That political activities are more 
pronounced in organizations that strongly rely on membership fees underlines further that 
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the decline of mass membership organizations is likely to have pronounced implications for 
the health of democratic civil societies. 
 
We tested our hypotheses based on two inclusive, national population surveys of groups in 
Germany and Switzerland. As pointed out earlier, our two countries are distinct in a variety 
of systemic characteristics relevant to group maintenance and the costliness of political 
activity. Our findings held despite various robustness checks considering the role of country 
contexts. Nevertheless, the question remains whether there are reasons to expect that the 
hypotheses derived from our incentive-theoretical perspective on group political activity – 
which is focused on intra-organizational properties, not systemic ones – are likely to play 
out differently in, for instance, a social-democratic welfare state with a constitutionally 
unitary structure, a configuration that our empirical analysis did not cover. The third sector 
literature suggests that – unlike in conservative and liberal welfare states included in our 
analysis – in social-democratic welfare states direct government provision of welfare 
services ‘frees’ third sector organizations from service provision and allows them to focus on 
political activity and advocacy (Salamon & Anheier, 1998). As far as there is a trade-off 
between political activities and government-funded service-provision, the conditions for 
political activity for organizations operating in the systems covered in this paper might have 
been comparatively less favorable. This difference, however, should not alter the nature of 
the relationships between membership size, composition and members’ structural position 
within an organization on the one hand, and political activity on the other (especially as we 
control for organizations’ dependency on state funding).  
 
Concluding with future research, our incentive-theoretical perspective would doubtlessly 
profit from being put on a broader empirical footing, not only in terms of wider cross-
national applications. Its application to longitudinal data tracing organizational change could 
contribute to the important debate whether and, if so, how voluntary organizations move in 
and out of politics. While some consider the “decisions of previously apolitical organizations 
to enter the political fray and of politically active organizations to exit politics and revert to 
apolitical status” as an important (though neglected) aspect affecting the composition of 
interest group communities (Schlozman 2010: 5; Anderson et al 2004), recent work on 
company lobbying stresses the ‘stickiness’ of lobbying (an activity that - once engaged in - 
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will be continued) (Drutman 2015). Our framework suggests that political activities are 
prioritized over other ways of incentive-provision only as long as certain intra-organizational 
conditions are met. For instance, a decline in individual members (reducing organizational 
complexity and the relevance of membership fees) should lead an organization to 
deprioritize political activities, suggesting policy engagement to be ‘volatile’ rather than 
‘sticky’. This, in turn, might well be a specific feature of composite organizations that - unlike 
individual companies - need to listen to their members: indeed, recent research on the 
breadth of policy engagement indicates that institutions and membership-based 
organizations show distinct patterns of activity (Halpin & Herschel III, 2012b: 592-3). While 
assessing organizational dynamics over time as well as studying the differences between 
groups and institutional actors, two important areas for future research, lie outside the 
scope of this paper, the framework presented provides a sound foundation to approach 
them.  
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Appendix A: Sampling checks 
 
As stated in the main text, the two country samples are very similar to each other and also 
comparable to samples described elsewhere, which increases our confidence that no systematic 
bias is introduced into the analysis due to unit nonresponse. First, the fraction of groups without 
individual members in Switzerland and Germany are 32% and 30% respectively. For 
organizations without corporate membership the numbers are 27% in Germany, and 30% in 
Switzerland. The remarkable similarity in the membership structure of groups in the two 
countries can also be seen in the overlapping density plots of Figure A1. The overlapping 
density plots in the left-hand panel (individual members) and the right-hand panel (corporate 
members) exhibit that about the same fraction of groups in both countries do not have one of 
the two forms of membership, while the rest of the two figures show that those groups that do 
have the respective form of membership have a remarkably similar size distribution for both 
types of membership in the two countries. This also shows that the size difference between the 
two countries does not – for the average (relatively small) organization – matter much for how 
many members they can attract (the slightly higher weight in the upper tail of both distributions 
of Germany indicates that the larger country has a slightly larger share of big organizations). In 
addition, we also checked the type of groups and find that in Switzerland we have 74% sectional 
groups (mostly professional groups and business associations) and 26% cause groups, while in 
Germany these numbers are 66% and 34% respectively (these numbers are similar to those 
reported by Dür and Mateo, 2013). Next, the average age of groups (in years) in the two 
countries is comparable, with 50.6 in Germany and 55.6 in Switzerland, and the age 
distributions in the two countries are similar as well, as Figure A2 shows. Finally, on the 
dependent variable – political activity – we also find that the distributions in the two country 
samples are fairly similar, with 8% of groups never being politically active in Germany 
compared to 7% in Switzerland, while 20% are active very often in the Germany and 12% in 
Switzerland. This comparability between the samples of our two countries, but also with 
samples reported elsewhere, increases our confidence that unit nonresponse is not problematic 
and does not systematically bias our results. 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Overlapping density plots for individual membership (A) and corporate membership 
(B) in Switzerland and Germany 
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Figure A2: Comparison of age distribution of groups in Germany and Switzerland 
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Appendix B: Factor analysis and communication index 
 
To check whether the nine variables we used to construct the communication index are useful 
tools to capture the communication behavior of groups with their members, we first run a factor 
analysis on these variables (see Table B1). As can be seen in the table, variables 2 to 7 load 
highly (>0.4) on the first factor, while the last two variables (social media and Twitter) make up 
the bulk of the second factor. Only the variable sending out printed materials does not load 
highly on any of the two issues. The Kaiser criterion and the factor loadings both indicate that 
two factors are adequate. This shows that while email and communication via the webpage have 
already found their way into the more traditional forms of membership communication, social 
media, Twitter and Blogs are still treated differently in their usage.  
 
Overall, this analysis shows that it is better to rely on a range of communication variables to 
capture the communication behavior of groups than on single items. However, the two factors 
are not equally important (see proportional variance) and have quite different numbers of 
variables with higher factor loadings. Thus, retrieving the factor scores for each observation and 
adding them would give disproportional weight to the variables of the second factor. Instead, as 
the factor loadings of the different variables on their main factor are relatively balance (possible 
with the exception of social media usage), meaning they contribute relatively equally to the 
factors in question, we construct the index in the way described in the main text by adding them 
up. In other words, the factor analysis confirms the about equal importance of the various 
individual communication variables, as they have similar factor loadings on their main factor. 
This indicates that combining these variables and giving them equal weight – as we have done – 
is appropriate for the construction of our communication index. Although the variable sending 
out printed materials does not load highly on any of the factors, we nevertheless keep this 
variable in the index, as producing informational journals for the members is an important tool 
particularly of larger organizations, and should therefore not be disregarded.  
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Table B1: Factor analysis of the variables making up the communication index 
 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
Send out printed materials (e.g. monthly journal) 0.21 0.07 
Send out newsletters  0.45 0.14 
Send out emails (general mailing list) 0.49 0.10 
Direct contact with members 0.61 0.08 
Organize membership events (social purpose) 0.51 0.12 
Organize membership events (informational purpose) 0.46 0.03 
Communication via membership area on webpage 0.51 0.05 
Use of social media to communicate with members 0.17 0.98 
Use of Twitter or a Blog to communicate with members 0.16 0.54 
SoS Loadings 1.64 1.32 
Proportional Variance 0.28 0.15 
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Appendix C: Variable description, summary statistics, and correlation table 
 
In this Appendix A we present detailed information about the variables used in the statistical 
models. Table C1 presents the items from the surveys in Germany and Switzerland used to 
construct the variables, and provides a general description of the variables (including how the 
variable in question was coded, and whether a transformation, such as the natural logarithm, 
has been applied). Table C2 then shows the most important summary statistics for the 
numerical variables used in the study, and provides an overview how often the different 
categories occur for the categorical variables. Finally, Figure C1 shows how strongly the various 
variables correlate with each other. The figure shows that correlation between the covariates is 
generally not problematic. Only the variables individual membership dummy and individual 
membership size correlate highly, yet this should be expected given how these two variables are 
constructed. The results indicate that this correlation is not problematic. 
 
 
 
Table C1: Description of all variables used in the study, including the survey items19  
Variable Survey item Variable description 
 
Dependent variable: 
Political activity  One defining feature of 
interest organization is their 
level of political activity. How 
often is your organization 
politically active? 
Survey respondents were asked to answer 
the question on a five-point scale from never 
to very often. We assigned numerical values 
to these five categories as follows: never (1), 
rarely (2), sometimes (3), often (4), and very 
often (5). Coding the dependent variable in 
this way for the ordered logit models 
ensures that positive coefficients indicate 
higher political activity levels. 
 
Independent variables: 
Individual 
membership 
dummy 
Which forms of membership 
does your organization allow: 
membership of individuals? 
We asked survey respondents three 
questions about membership type 
(individual membership, corporate 
                                                          
19 This questionnaire was in German for Germany. Swiss participants could choose between a German and a 
French version – covering the two predominant languages in the country – to do justice to the countries’ 
multilingualism. All questions in both countries and languages were the same. 
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membership, and other forms of 
membership). The question about individual 
membership, used to operationalize the 
individual membership dummy, was a 
binary yes/no question (with no serving as 
the baseline category in the models). 
Individual 
membership size 
How many individual 
members are currently 
registered with your 
organization? 
If survey respondent answered yes to the 
question about the presence of individual 
members, we next asked how many such 
individual members the organization had at 
the time of the survey. This variable is highly 
skewed, as many organizations have no or 
only very few individual members, while 
there are also a few very large organizations 
(the maximum is 2.7 million members for a 
large union). This skew also explains the 
large difference between the mean and the 
median, the former being 13350, while the 
latter is 101 individual members. For this 
reason, the natural logarithm is applied 
when this variable is used in the statistical 
models.  
Corporate 
membership size 
How many corporate 
members are currently 
registered with your 
organization? 
If survey respondent answered yes to the 
question about the presence of corporate 
members, we next asked how many such 
corporate members the organization had at 
the time of the survey. Again, this variable is 
highly skewed, with many groups not 
allowing corporate membership, while one 
group in the dataset has 293,000 such 
members. The mean is 1210, and the median 
20, which is another indication for the 
strong skew of this variable, and we again 
apply the natural logarithm. 
Membership fees How is your organization 
financed? Amount of 
membership fees (in 
thousands) 
In this block of questions survey 
respondents were asked to provide the 
amount of money they received through 
various streams of income (membership 
fees, selling of products and services, 
donations, and state subsidies). For the 
42 
 
membership fees variable, the mean value 
earned by the interest organizations in our 
dataset is €620,300, with many groups 
earning very little (or nothing) through this 
source of income, while the maximum is €56 
million. The median for this variable is 
€71,000. Again we see a strong skew of this 
variable, with many relatively small 
organizations earning only limited amounts 
of funds from membership fees, while few 
large organizations receive large amounts of 
money. Consequently, the membership fees 
variable is logarithmized. 
Membership 
communication 
How often do you use the 
following instruments to 
communicate with your 
members? 
- Send out printed materials 
- Send out newsletters 
- Send out emails via a 
general mailing list of 
members 
- Direct contact with 
members 
- Organize events for 
members (general and 
social purpose) 
- Organize events for 
members (informational 
purpose) 
- Communication via 
(password protected) 
membership area on 
webpage 
- Use of social media to 
communicate with 
members 
- Use of Twitter or a Blog to 
communicate with 
members 
To capture organizations’ communication 
with their members, survey respondents 
were asked how regularly they send out 
newsletters or have direct meetings with 
members. In total, there are nine such 
questions on member communication in the 
surveys, all of which could be answered on a 
five-point scale indicating that the specific 
form of communication happens almost 
never (0), a few times a year (1), a few times a 
month (2), a few times a week (3), or daily 
(4). The numeric values (as shown in the 
brackets) of these nine variables were 
summed up. Thus, the higher the value of the 
resulting variable is, the more intensive the 
communication between groups and their 
members. The maximum observed value in 
the dataset is 33 (out of a possible maximum 
of 36), while four organizations reported 
that they almost never used any of the nine 
ways of communicating with their members. 
The mean is 12.97, and the median is 12. 
 
 
Control variables: 
Competition If you think of the issue area To capture competition between groups we 
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in which your organization is 
active: how visible are other 
groups active in the same 
issue area? 
rely on a survey question on the visibility of 
other groups in the field of activity of an 
organization. Again, survey respondents had 
to indicate on a five-point scale how visible 
other groups are: no visibility (1), low 
visibility (2), medium visibility (3), high 
visibility (4) and very highly visible (5). The 
mean value in the dataset is 2.82, with 70 
organization selecting the lowest possible 
competition value, and 39 the highest. This 
variable is included in the models as a 
categorical variable, with the lowest level of 
competition acting as the baseline category. 
Group type N/A In this paper we distinguish between cause 
groups and sectional groups. No question in 
the survey allowed the identification of 
groups as being cause groups or sectional 
groups. For this reason, all organizations 
which answered all relevant questions, and 
which could be identified through the 
information they provided (some 
organizations chose not to provide either 
Internet or email address) were hand- 
coded. 282 of the groups (about 30%) were 
found to be cause groups, while 656 are 
sectional groups, with the latter serving as 
the baseline category in the statistical 
models.  
State subsidies How is your organization 
financed? Amount of state 
subsidies (in thousands) 
In this block of questions survey 
respondents were asked to provide the 
amount of money they received through 
various streams of income (membership 
fees, selling of products and services, 
donations, and state subsidies). For the state 
subsidies variable, 604 of the groups in our 
final dataset (about 64%) did not report the 
receipt of any state subsidies, while some 
organization receive large contributions 
from public funds. The biggest state subsidy 
reported was €112 million by an 
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international aid organization, yet is should 
be noted that money allocated to aid project 
does not (or only indirectly) contribute to 
the advocacy budget of organizations. Due to 
the skewedness of this variable the logged 
form is included in the models. 
Issue area Please indicate the main issue 
area of activity of your 
organization. 
We also include the main issue area of 
activity into the models, as identified by the 
groups in the surveys. Specifically, 
respondents could choose from the 
following six options to identify their main 
area of political activity: economics, 
education, social issues, environment, 
religion, and others. 
 
Age of group What is the founding year of 
your organization? 
This variable records the age of an 
organization in years, as provided by the 
survey respondents, and is logarithmized. 
Country dummy N/A This variable records whether an 
organization responded to the German or 
the Swiss survey. 
 
 
Table C2: Summary statistics for all numerical (panel A) and categorical (panel B) variables 
used in the models of the main text (n=939) 
A. Numeric Variables Mean Median SD Min Max 
Individual memb. size (logged) 4.25 4.62 3.51 0 14.81 
Corporate memb. size (logged) 2.86 3.04 2.4 0 12.59 
Membership fees (logged) 11.11 11.17 2.34 2.40 17.84 
Membership communication 12.97 12 5.90 0 33 
State subsidies (logged) 4.14 0 5.73 0 18.53 
Age of group (logged) 3.60 3.74 0.90 0 5.55 
 
B. Categorical Variables 
 
# occurrences of categories 
Political activity  Never: 76; Rarely: 174; Sometimes: 289; Often: 251; Very often: 149 
Ind. memb. dummy No individual members: 292; Individual members present: 647 
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Group type Sectional groups: 656; Cause groups: 283 
Country dummy Switzerland: 484; Germany: 455 
Competition None: 70; Low: 268; Medium: 405; High: 157, Very high: 39  
Issue area Economics: 280; Education: 141; Religion: 15; Social issues: 207; 
Environment: 54; Others: 242 
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Figure C1: Correlation plot for all variables used in the statistical models  
 
Note: Both the size and the color of the circles indicate the strength of the 
relationship, the larger the circle, the stronger the relationship. Light gray shades 
indicate negative and darker shades positive relationships. 
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Appendix D: Multiple imputations 
 
In this Appendix B we lay out the problem of missing data in our dataset in more detail, and 
then explain how we use data imputation techniques as a way to test the robustness of the 
results presented in the main text. We also briefly discuss the models presented in Tables D1, 
D2, and D3.  
Out of the total of 2,231 organizations that participated in our survey, we identified 
1,780 for which our definition of groups as organizations with members applied (for this 
identification purpose we made use of survey items specifically asking whether groups have 
members, see Appendix A). However, many of these 1,780 organizations left information 
needed for inclusion in the analysis of this paper blank. For instance, 624 groups did not reply to 
the set of questions about the sources of their budget such as membership fees and state 
subsidies – a much higher nonresponse rate than for any other question (only 87 organizations 
did not reply to the question about competition, the second highest nonresponse rate in the 
survey). The 841 organizations with missing information were excluded from the analysis 
described in the main text.  
As a robustness check we use multiple imputation techniques to complete missing 
values for the variables used in this study, and then test whether the results change when 
running the same models as in the main text on five imputed datasets. We use the mice package 
available in the R computing environment to implement the multiple imputations (Buuren & 
Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011), and apply predictive mean matching to impute missing values of 
our quantitative variables (Morris et al., 2014). For the categorical variables we apply logistic 
regression to impute the variable group type (as this is the only variable with missing data and 
only two levels), and ordered logistic regression models for variables with more than two levels 
(Allison, 2005). For most variables no missing data (political activity, individual membership 
dummy, issue area, country dummy) or less than 100 missing values (size individual membership, 
size corporate membership, membership communication, competition, age of group) had to be 
imputed. Only the two variables capturing sources of income and the hand-coded group type 
variable had higher numbers of missing values, the latter because only those organizations were 
hand-coded for which enough information existed to be included in the models of the main text.  
As already mentioned, five sets of values to fill in missing values in the original dataset 
were generated using the specified procedures, which leaves us with five completed datasets 
after the imputation procedure. This allows us to run each of the three models presented in the 
main text for five times on the different imputations. Thus, we are able to get a sense of the 
stability of the estimators across the five imputed datasets. Again, we run the same Bayesian 
ordered logit models described in the main text with 10,000 iterations overall (3,000 for burn-
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in), but this time with the higher number of observations of 1,780 for the full model, 798 for the 
Swiss, and 982 for the German model. As for the models reported in the main text, all the 
diagnostics for chain length, stationarity, and convergence pass the test for all models reported 
in the tables below.  
Table D1 reports the results for the five imputations of the overall model, in Table D2 
the results for Switzerland are shown, and in Table B3 for Germany. The results are remarkably 
similar to those reported in Table 2 of the main text, and also the models across the various 
iterations show highly comparable results. This is also true for the two budgetary variables 
membership fees and state subsidies, despite the many missing values we had to impute for these 
two variables. Overall, the very similar outcomes when almost doubling the number of cases are 
a strong indication for the robustness of the findings reported in the main text of this study.  
The only (small) exception to the general rule of comparable and stable results is the 
group type variable, for which we had to impute the data for all 841 observations not included in 
the models reported in the main text. The results for this variable show the expected direction 
in all models, but the effects tend to be somewhat smaller than in the main models (particularly 
for the imputations 1 and 3). This shows that imputation techniques for variables with many 
missing values can be problematic, and that imputing binary variables is more problematic than 
using such techniques for quantitative data, albeit the used logistic regression method is one of 
the more reliable methods (Allison, 2005). Overall, however, the model results using the 
imputed dataset are stable and increase our confidence in the robustness of the findings 
reported in the main text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D1: Posterior summaries for determinants of political activity using five imputed 
datasets (for Switzerland and Germany combined) 
 Imput. 1 Imput. 2 Imput. 3 Imput. 4 Imput. 5 
Individ. membership dummy  -0.96 -1.03 -0.97 -1.03 -1.02 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) 
Size individual membership  0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Size corporate membership  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Membership fees  0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.09 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
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Member communication  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Competition (base = no competition) 
Low competition  1.31 1.33 1.27 1.29 1.26 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Medium competition  1.69 1.74 1.68 1.75 1.63 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
High competition  2.04 2.09 2.06 2.11 1.98 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Very high competition  2.45 2.51 2.52 2.46 2.32 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) 
Group type (base = sectional groups) 
Cause groups 0.21 0.58 0.16 0.55 0.67 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
State subsidies  0.004 -0.01 0.001 -0.004 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age of group  -0.15 -0.11 -0.14 -0.15 -0.09 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Country dummy (base=CH) 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.27 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Issue area (base = economic groups) 
Education  0.20 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.26 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Religion  -0.48 -0.59 -0.47 -0.54 -0.48 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Social  -0.63 -0.80 -0.65 -0.75 -0.70 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) 
Environment  -0.01 -0.17 0.03 -0.16 -0.04 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Other  -0.05 -0.24 0.001 -0.18 -0.16 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) 
Intercepts omitted      
Num. obs.  1780 1780 1780 1780 1780 
Note: The table reports point estimates (posterior means) and estimation errors (in brackets) needed 
to construct HPD intervals  
 
Table D2: Posterior summaries for determinants of political activity using five imputed 
datasets (for Switzerland only) 
 Imput.1  Imput.2  Imput.3  Imput.4  Imput.5 
Individ. membership dummy  -1.25 -1.38 -1.32 -1.38 -1.38 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) 
Size individual membership  0.15 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
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Size corporate membership  -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.003 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Membership fees  0.19 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.12 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Member communication  0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Competition (base = no competition) 
Low competition  1.37 1.37 1.30 1.30 1.20 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Medium competition  1.70 1.74 1.65 1.67 1.56 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
High competition  1.85 1.86 1.77 1.94 1.77 
 (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Very high competition  2.86 3.05 2.96 2.97 2.67 
 (0.42) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.41) 
Group type (base = sectional groups) 
Cause groups  0.20 0.62 0.23 0.33 0.76 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) 
State subsidies  -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age of group  -0.14 -0.13 -0.16 -0.14 -0.06 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Issue area (base = economic groups) 
Education  0.26 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.25 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Religion  -0.51 -0.61 -0.49 -0.56 -0.52 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) 
Social  -0.60 -0.92 -0.58 -0.80 -0.90 
 (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) 
Environment  0.02 -0.16 0.03 -0.05 -0.10 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Other  0.17 -0.04 0.21 0.08 -0-002 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) 
Intercepts omitted      
Num. obs.  798 798 798 798 798 
Note: The table reports point estimates (posterior means) and estimation errors (in brackets) needed 
to construct HPD intervals  
 
 
 
Table D3: Posterior summaries for determinants of political activity using five imputed 
datasets (for Germany only) 
 Imput.1  Imput.2  Imput.3  Imput.4  Imput.5 
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Individ. membership dummy  -0.80 -0.85 -0.83 -0.88 -0.85 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Size individual membership  0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Size corporate membership  0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Membership fees  0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Member communication  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Competition (base = no competition) 
Low competition  1.24 1.30 1.26 1.33 1.32 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Medium competition  1.71 1.77 1.75 1.85 1.70 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) 
High competition  2.13 2.27 2.28 2.27 2.16 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30) 
Very high competition  2.20 2.28 2.28 2.25 2.13 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
Group type (base = sectional groups) 
Cause groups  0.26 0.53 0.09 0.71 0.60 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
State subsidies  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age of group  -0.19 -0.11 -0.15 -0.17 -0.12 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Issue area (base = economic groups) 
Education  0.13 0.12 0.22 0.14 0.24 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Religion  -0.50 -0.61 -0.47 -0.54 -0.46 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Social  -0.59 -0.69 -0.58 -0.67 -0.58 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
Environment  -0.10 -0.21 -0.01 -0.27 -0.07 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Other  -0.21 -0.39 -0.13 -0.34 -0.26 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) 
Intercepts omitted      
Num. obs.  982 982 982 982 982 
Note: The table reports point estimates (posterior means) and estimation errors (in brackets) needed 
to construct HPD intervals  
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Appendix E: Interaction Models 
 
The models presented in Table E1 of this Appendix E demonstrate that the interaction terms 
between the country dummy and the variables capturing the four hypotheses are all very small 
in size (and insignificant in frequentist terms) and do not change the results reported in the 
main models of the paper. This demonstrates that the country context does not systematically 
influence the results of our key variables, and therefore that our theory does not lack such 
context specific elements, at least in our country selection. The results thus corroborate the 
robustness of the country dummy variable approach used in the model reported in the main 
text. 
 
Table E1: Posterior summaries for determinants of political activity, including interaction 
terms for the country dummy with the variables capturing our hypotheses  
 
 Baseline 
Model 
H1 
Interactio
ns 
H2 
Interactio
n 
H3 
Interactio
n 
H4 
Interactio
n 
Individ. membership dummy 
(H1a) 
-0.84 -1.09 -0.85 -0.85 -0.87 
 (0.25) (0.34) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Size individual membership 
(H1b) 
0.1 0.14 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Size corporate membership (H2) -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Membership fees (H3) 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.19 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Member communication (H4) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Competition (base = no competition) 
Low competition 1.3 1.29 1.3 1.3 1.29 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Medium competition 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.62 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
High competition 2.03 2.02 2.03 2.03 2.03 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Very high competition 2.5 2.48 2.5 2.5 2.49 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) 
Group type (base = sectional groups) 
Cause groups 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
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State subsidies -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age of group -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Country dummy (base=CH) 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.5 1.28 
 (0.13) (0.22) (0.19) (0.30) (0.60) 
Issue area (base = economic group) 
Education -0.67 -0.69 -0.67 -0.67 -0.68 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Religion -1.21 -1.22 -1.22 -1.21 -1.17 
 (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) 
Social -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Environment -0.28 -0.3 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Other 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.1 0.11 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Interaction terms     
H1a * country 0.44    
  (0.46)    
H1b * country -0.07    
  (0.06)    
H2 * country  -0.02   
   (0.05)   
H3 * country    -0.07 
     (0.05) 
H4 * country   0.01  
    (0.02)  
Num. obs. 939 939 939 939 939 
Note: The table reports point estimates (posterior means) and estimation errors (in brackets) needed 
to construct HPD intervals   
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